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Partnered women’s contribution to household labor income: persistent 
inequalities among couples and their determinants  
 
Martina Dieckhoff, Vanessa Gash, Antje Mertens and Laura Romeu Gordo 
Abstract 
This paper explores earnings inequalities within dual-earner couples in East and West 
Germany drawing on household-level panel data from 1992-2016. It has three aims: (1) to 
analyze how the partner pay gap (the pay gap between partners within one household) has 
developed over time, given institutional change, and whether the extent of inequality and 
temporal development vary between East and West Germany; (2) to explore variation in the 
partner pay gap by male partners’ absolute earnings; and (3) to investigate the micro-level 
determinants of earnings inequalities within couples and determine whether their relevance 
varies between East and West Germany as well as by male partners’ absolute earnings. We 
find women earn substantially less than their partners, and our regression results find no 
indication of a declining partner pay gap. Besides substantial variation between East and West 
Germany, our results also reveal important group-specific variation in the extent of the 
partner pay gap as well as in its determinants. 
Key words: partner pay gap, gender inequality, employment, institutional change, time 
trends 
 
1 Introduction 
Income inequality has risen substantially since the 1980s (OECD 2015), as has inequality in 
households’ access to work (Gregg et al. 2002). One of the mechanisms behind these rising 
inequalities at the household level is said to be the shift towards marital homogamy (Blossfeld 
and Buchholz 2009; Schwartz and Mare 2005). Marital homogamy, coupled with increased 
female labor market participation, is held to reinforce both earnings and employment 
inequalities across households. According to this argument couples with weak human capital 
are often at the bottom of the earnings distribution, because they are unable to access stable 
and well paid jobs, while those with considerable human capital resources, on the other hand, 
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are mostly concentrated at the top of the distribution with both partners in stable 
employment with high earnings. Crucial to this literature is a measure of homogamous 
marriage/unions based on each male or female partners’ economic rankings relative to those 
of their own sex (e.g. Hyslop 2001; Schwartz 2010), with many researchers identifying an 
increasing tendency for high earning men to be married with high earning women (e.g. 
Sweeney and Cancian 2004). While such a strategy correctly identifies the relative rankings of 
partners in an economy’s hierarchy and their similarity in terms of this relative positioning on 
the sex-specific income distribution, it fails to offer a clear measure of earnings inequalities 
between partners. Moreover, research on the partner pay gap, the differences in relative 
contributions to household labor income within couples, suggests that there is a troubling 
maintenance of gender inequalities in relationships: men in the majority of instances continue 
to substantially out-earn their female partners (Stier and Mandel 2009). These gaps in earned 
income have also been found to have adverse effects on women’s labor market outcomes. 
Women in households with large partner pay gaps are more likely to decrease their working-
time or to leave paid employment altogether (Dieckhoff et al. 2016; Shafer 2011), which in 
turn expose women and children to poverty risk in instances of relationship dissolution 
(Gadalla 2008; Holden 1991). While there is a considerable literature on the sources and 
consequences of income and employment inequalities across households, the literature 
which examines inequality dynamics within households – especially in dual-earner households 
– is still comparatively scant. Our contribution therefore seeks to direct attention to the 
economic inequalities in dual-earning heterosexuali couples. This paper examines the partner 
pay gap, its development over time and its determinants. Crucially, it also adopts an 
intersectional perspective extending current knowledge in its examination of variation in the 
partner pay gap by socio-economic position (defined by the male partner’s position in the 
earnings distribution)ii. Finally, our paper takes a comparative stance in its examination of the 
partner pay gap in East and West Germany. Both contexts still differ in terms of their gender 
culture and also in terms of their economic situation. Our focus on dual-earners means that 
we can examine the temporal development of within couple inequalities net of women’s 
increased labor force participation and explore the relevance of both spouses’ labor market 
resources, behavior and situation on earnings’ inequalities within couples. Our study draws 
on the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) offering micro-level panel data collected at the 
household level, and for both partners, for a period covering 25 years.  
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2 Background: economic inequalities at the household level  
2.1 Previous empirical work  
Feminist researchers have been advocates of women’s economic independence in 
relationships since the 1980s (Sørensen and McLanahan 1987; Pahl 1983), with attempts to 
‘deconstruct’ the conceptualization of the family as a ‘unit of shared interests’ (Hobson 1990). 
Empirical analyses of women’s economic position within marriage have been very consistent 
over time: marriages tend to be characterized by women’s economic dependence on their 
husbands. Several papers, using the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS), presented evidence 
suggesting that women tend to contribute less to household labor income than their male 
partners. Most of these papers, however, did not focus on dual-earning couples: Hobson 
(1990) found only 3-12 percent of couples to be equally contributing to household labor 
income, with the remainder characterized by strong inequalities to the female partner’s 
disadvantage. Similarly, Bianchi et al. (1999) found women to contribute substantially less in 
all countries examined, though wives’ economic dependence was found to be lowest in social-
democratic countries and greatest in conservative welfare states. Huber et al. (2009) arrive 
at similar conclusions and show in their analyses that the most central macro-level 
determinants of partnered women’s contribution to household earnings are whether and 
how much women work (measured by rates of female labour force participation and part-
time employment).  Stier and Mandel (2009) reveal that women in dual-earner couples 
contribute 28-39 percent on average. Institutional context shapes her contributions however: 
women’s relative contribution (within dual-earner couples) was lower in countries with a high 
share of female part-time employment and long maternity leave, while childcare coverage for 
small children increased it (ibid.). Evidence based on more recent data from the mid to late 
2000s, and using a broader definition of household income, continues to find that women 
contribute substantially less to household income (Dotti Sani 2015). It is notable that all 
studies examining within-couple inequalities in household income contributions, even with 
the considerable passage of time, conclude that women’s earnings within households remain 
secondary. The persistence of women’s sizably lower contributions, even in countries with 
policy support for working-women and working-motherhood, suggests mechanisms for 
gendered allocation of paid and unpaid work within the home that are deeply entrenched. 
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We review the theories that offer accounts of the possible mechanisms fostering these 
gendered inequalities below.  
 
 
2.2 Theoretical Accounts   
Becker’s (1991) household specialisation model theorises that he specialises in paid work and 
she specialises in unpaid house- and care-work. Specialisation is presented as a utility 
maximizing strategy, which is equally beneficial for both partners. Households are held to 
profit from men’s stronger market-specific human capital on the one hand and from women’s 
‘biological commitment’ for care work in the home on the other. Gender specialization is 
therefore used to explain partnered women’s economic inactivity or their part-time 
employment.  Some scholars have extended Becker’s specialization model (Becker and Moen 
1999; Killewald and Gough 2013, p. 479) arguing that specialization can also be understood 
to be in operation within dual full-time working couples with one partner having a “career” 
and the other “holding a job”. This would also constitute specialization as his career is 
prioritized while she is responsible for managing family and home reflected in: her holding a 
job offering more flexibility, fewer career opportunities and effectively fewer annual working 
hours.  
Game theoretic and household bargaining models (Breen and Cooke 2005; Manser 
and Brown 1980), by contrast, conceptualize within household dynamics as conflictual, with 
couples described as bargaining over responsibility for unpaid work within the home. Here 
each partner uses their resources - be they economic, social or cultural - to avoid (or reduce 
the amount of) unpaid work within the home. From this perspective the weaker partner will 
have lower earning power as a direct result of their disproportionate responsibility for house 
and care work.  
Finally, gender norm theory proposes that gender norms determine households’ 
distribution of paid and unpaid labor. Here all action is regarded to be gendered, with 
gendered norms of behavior dictating the allocation of paid and unpaid care and housework 
couples engage in (West and Zimmerman 1987; Shelton and John 1996). Indeed, recent 
evidence for the US suggests that gender identity norms prescribe a strong preference for 
men to out-earn their female partners (Bertrand et al. 2015).  
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The theories reviewed here would predict women’s economic positioning to be 
inferior to that of their partner even within dual-earner households. This is due to women’s 
disproportionate investment in (or allocated responsibility for) housework and childcare 
having important short-term and long-term implications for their labor market advancement 
and returns. One reason behind earnings’ inequalities within dual-earner couples is that 
women (especially mothers) often work part-time. However, even when working full-time, 
partnered women can be expected to contribute less to household labor income as the family 
dynamics outlined above bear direct implications for their labor market behavior, for how 
they are perceived by employers and thence their labor market outcomes.  
 
2.3 Variability by socio-economic position  
Research into the intersectionalities of women’s labor market outcomes by socio-economic 
group (Budig and Hodges 2010; Mandel 2012; Cooke 2014) underscores the importance of 
analyses beyond the mean. We can expect that their spouse’s earnings position has 
implications for partnered women’s labor supply (e.g. the likelihood to work part-time or to 
leave the labor market) as well as the types of jobs women hold which in turn influences their 
relative contributions to household income. High spousal earnings can decrease female 
supply as it facilitates both specialization in housework as well as female retreat into 
traditional gender roles, should this reflect the couple’s preference. Women married to low 
earners, by contrast, likely face financial pressures to work longer hours. More importantly 
even, high earning partners’ may impose important constraints on their wives’ labor market 
participation and career pursuit due to the job characteristics of highly paid jobs (over-time; 
job-related travel etc.) – constraints which women married to low-earners are less likely to 
experience. Women married to high earners may thus face unique pressures to leave the 
labor market when small children are around, reduce their working hours or – if working full-
time – choose jobs which are still flexible enough to “take a backseat to the needs of the 
household and the spouse’s career” (Killewald and Gough 2013, p. 479). Qualitative evidence 
by Stone (2007) provides strong support for the “constraint argument”. She interviewed high 
achieving professional women (e.g. doctors, lawyers, bankers) who left their careers and 
exited the labor market because of the demands and privileging of his career, and specifically 
his absence from the home due to work commitments. At the same time, though, his higher 
earnings could make it economically possible to outsource housework and childcare enabling 
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her to work long hours – if this is a couple’s preference. However, especially in West-
Germany, most parents believe that it is not good for children (especially those of pre-school 
age) to spend excessive hours in non-parental care (Fagnani 2002). Overall, there are thus 
strong grounds to expect women partnered with high earners to contribute lower shares to 
household labor income than women partnered with low earners. In a world in which 
partners were randomly matched, of course, we would arrive at the same prediction even if 
women’s labor market behavior was completely unresponsive to their husbands’ earnings 
and labor market situation. But we know that partners are not randomly matched: unions 
tend to be educationally homogenous (this is also true for our sample, where the share of 
educational homogeneity is >65 percent, cf. Table A1). Men with high earnings potential tend 
to be matched to women with similar earnings potential. The implications of assortative 
mating for women’s career decisions are unclear. (see discussion in Shafer 2011, p. 252). 
Those women who are most likely to be confronted with the constraints of their partner’s 
high-paying job as well as to be provided with the economic freedom to follow traditional 
gender norms and reduce their working time tend to be women who would have the highest 
opportunity costs if they reduce working hours or opt for non-career jobs. By contrast, while 
women married to lower earners likely have lower absolute earnings given their (on average) 
lower education and hence lower individual opportunity costs to not working or to working 
reduced hours, these women’s earnings are more central to the economic security of lower 
income households. Researchers have tried to examine the relative importance of individual 
economic opportunity and household context for female economic outcome over the years 
(see for example Harkness et al. 1997). What is becoming clearer now is the comparative 
stability in women’s minority earner status within households (Moen and Sweet 2003; Van 
Berkel and De Graaf 1998) and empirical evidence appears to suggest that women’s relative 
earnings within a relationship  are more powerful in shaping women’s employment than 
previously thought (Shafer 2011).  
An empirical assessment of variability in women’s relative contributions by their 
partner’s socio-economic position regarding (1) the extent of within couple earnings 
inequality as well as (2) the determinants of these inequalities is therefore important to 
further explore the role of household context and opportunity costs. 
 
2.4 Institutions and the variance in cultural context 
7 
 
We expect both institutional and gender normative contexts to shape earnings’ inequalities 
among partners as well as the socio-economic group differences therein. Social policies, 
employment regulation and gender cultures are expected to shape earnings inequalities 
within dual-earner couples via their effect on type and extent of labor market participation 
and attainment. The institutional and macro-economic context of Germany has changed 
substantially during our 25 year observation period. These institutional and macro-economic 
changes are anticipated to inform the trends in the partner pay gap. We expect women’s 
labor income to be both directly shaped via the shifting employment opportunities available 
to women, and indirectly shaped via the shifting employment opportunities women’s 
partners face. Here, our distinction between direct and indirect effects seeks to underscore 
the twin concerns women in dual-earning households face, with women’s relative labor 
income a function of both her and her partner’s success in obtaining labor income.  
 
2.4.1 Gender Culture  
Cultural norms are central to women’s labor force participation and labor market outcomes 
(Pfau-Effinger 1998; Pfau-Effinger and Smidt 2011; 1998; Boeckman et al. 2015); Dieckhoff et 
al. 2016; Evertsson and Grunow 2016). While East and West Germany have the same 
institutional framework, the cultural legacy of the socialist German Democratic Republic has 
imparted a gender culture committed to working motherhood and a gender-equal division of 
paid work in East Germany while in West Germany more traditional views regarding the 
gender division of labor prevail (Trappe et al. 2015). Even though some convergence in female 
labor supply between East and West Germany has been observed (Simonson et al. 2011), 
research continues to show that distinct cultural norms in East and West Germany lead to 
different employment behavior in both areas (e.g. Pfau-Effinger and Smidt 2011). Cultural 
norms relating to gender roles and working motherhood in East and West Germany continue 
to differ and remain important in structuring inequality dynamics within couples (e.g. 
Evertsson and Grunow 2016, Rosenfeld et al. 2004; Bauernschuster and Rainer 2012). We 
therefore conduct separate analyses of East and West Germany. 
 
 
2.4.2 Institutions and institutional change 
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Family policies – especially maternity or parental leave arrangementsiii and childcare 
provision – are central in shaping women’s labor supply and attainment and hence for 
understanding their relative economic standing within the family. Maternity and parental 
leave function as a form of employment protection (see e.g. discussion in Mandel 2012) 
providing women/carers with the right to return to their position after a period of leave. 
While paid maternity and parental leave can thus serve to maintain mother’s employment 
and occupational status, the effect of leave arrangements has been shown to hinge on its 
duration (see e.g. Stier and Mandel 2009; Boeckmann et al. 2015). No or very short leaves as 
well as very long leaves are deemed detrimental, while leaves of moderate duration are 
considered best suited for maintaining labor market attachment and encouraging positive 
career outcomes (e.g. Stier and Mandel 2009; Boeckmann et al. 2015). The total duration of 
paid leave in Germany has traditionally been long: in 1992 the first year of our observation 
period parental leave had just been extended from 18 to 36 months (though the lump sum 
benefit was just paid up to 24 months for parents below a certain household income 
threshold). However, parental reforms in 2007 entailed a substantial decrease in paid leave 
duration to 12 months (or 14 months if the other parent also takes up at least 2 months of 
leave), while at the same time moving from income-tested benefit to generous income 
replacement (e.g. Spiess and Wrohlich 2008).  
The availability and affordability of childcare are known to exert positive effects on 
women’s labor market outcomes. Germany is regularly accused of providing insufficient 
childcare coverage – especially for small children below three years of age –negatively 
affecting women’s labor market attachment and opportunities (Gash 2009, Hank and 
Kreyenfeld 2003; see also Dieckhoff et al. 2016, p. 132 for an overview). More generally, 
insufficient availability makes it difficult for young mothers to work full-time. Childcare 
provision for children under three has started to experience notable growth from the 2000s 
onwards: from 17 percent in 2006 to 27 percent in 2010, to 37 percent by 2015 (OECD 2018). 
Relevant for our comparative perspective: in East Germany childcare coverage for very small 
children has traditionally been and continues to be markedly higher than in West Germany 
(Trappe et al. 2015). 
Another policy dimension relevant to women’s labor market attachment and 
attainment concerns the availability of part-time employment. While part-time work 
facilitates labor force participation, it has been argued to be detrimental for women’s labor 
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market attainment. It has also been shown empirically, that part-time arrangements have 
negative implications for women’s relative earnings within partnerships (Stier and Mandel, 
2009). The rate of female part-time employment in Germany has increased substantially 
during the period we are observing from 26 to 37 percent – the nature of this change has 
been continuous (OECD 2019). Female part-time employment is notably lower in East 
Germany compared to West Germany, and there is no indication that rates of female part-
time employment rates will converge (WSI 2018).  
As argued earlier, partnered women’s relative contribution to household labor 
income, or: the partner pay gap, is a function of both partner’s labor market decisions, 
behavior, position and outcomes. High levels of employment, unemployment and wage 
protection make it less risky for households to prioritize one, typically male, breadwinner’s 
earnings. The German labor market has undergone substantial deregulation during our 
observation period, which can be expected to have changed household level decision making 
regarding partnered women’s employment and career decisions, because gender 
specialization has become increasingly economically risky (cf. Oppenheimer 1997). While the 
level of protection for permanent jobs has not changed notably during the time period we 
observe here, the deregulation of temporary employment had its’ onset already in the mid-
1980s and further continued over the time period analyzed with the most notable changes 
occurring in 1997/98 and 2003/04 (OECD 2013). Collective bargaining coverage has declined 
substantially; the most dramatic drop occurred in the first half of the 1990s, but the decline 
has continued steadily since (Visser 2013). Finally, labor market reforms (the Hartz reforms) 
introduced in the early and mid-2000s have substantially changed benefit entitlement rights: 
unemployment benefit duration was reduced, the means-tested but earnings-related 
unemployment assistance was replaced by basic income support, and conditionality was 
increased. 
3 Hypotheses and Analytical Aims 
Our analytical aim is, broadly, threefold. First, adopting a macro perspective, we explore 
whether, given institutional change, earnings’ inequalities within couples have changed over 
time and also, whether the extent of inequality and their over-time development vary 
between East and West Germany. Second, again taking a macro-level perspective, we explore 
variation in the couple-level earnings inequalities by male partner’s socio-economic position. 
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Third, we want to investigate the micro-level determinants which increase or decrease 
partnered women’s contribution to household labor income and whether their importance 
varies between East and West Germany as well as by their partners’ positioning in the 
earnings distribution.  
3.1 Hypotheses pertaining to variability in the partner pay gap  
In line with the theoretical accounts outlined above and previous empirical studies, we expect 
women to contribute less to household earnings than men. Concerning time trends, we 
expect a development towards more equal contributions to household labor income among 
dual-earner couples (Hypothesis 1). This is anticipated because the trend towards increased 
childcare and reduced maternity leave should improve women’s labor market outcomes and 
attainment (with these positive effects believed to outweigh the negative ones of increasing 
part-time employment), and also because the ongoing trend of employment deregulation 
should increase female labor supply by making household specialization more risky. We 
further expect cultural and economic context to affect the extent of the partner pay gap and 
therefore hypothesize the partner pay gap to be less pronounced in East Germany compared 
to West Germany (Hypothesis 2). This is anticipated because more egalitarian gender norms 
are conducive to equal dual-working and earning arrangements in partnerships in Eastern 
Germany; and also because childcare coverage continues to be higher than in the West. 
Moreover, overall income inequality is lower in East than in West Germany and the level of 
overall income inequality has been shown to have implications for the gender wage gap (Blau 
and Kahn 1992). Additionally, East German men earn much less than West German men. Both 
of these economic factors should also lead to lower levels of inequality in contributions to 
household labor income in Eastern Germany. We further anticipate important differences in 
the partner-pay gap by male partner’s position in the earnings’ distribution: and expect that 
women’s relative contribution to household labor income will be lower if partnered with a 
high earning man and higher if partnered with a low earning man (Hypothesis 3a) despite the 
high share of educational homogamy in our sample. This prediction assumes that the couple 
context – with its constraints, economic needs, and economic possibilities – is more central 
for shaping women’s decisions and outcomes than women’s individual opportunity costs. In 
addition to our theoretical reasons for expecting a larger pay gap in couples where he is a 
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high earner, the structure of the earnings distribution also plays a role: male wages in the 
upper bound of the income distribution are generally more spread out than female ones. 
 
3.2  Hypotheses pertaining to determinants of the partner pay gap  
There exist a number of micro-level variables, which we expect – in line with previous 
empirical evidence and theory – to affect her relative contributions to household labor 
income. We predict that these vary between East and West Germany as well as by partners’ 
earnings levels. We expect variability in these central micro-level predictors in East and West 
Germany (Hypothesis 4), anticipating that children (Hypothesis 4.1), her education 
(Hypothesis 4.2), and his labor market insecurity (Hypothesis 4.3) are less predictive of the 
partner pay gap in East Germany compared to West. This is hypothesized to be partly a 
function of differences in the prevalent gender culture: the general preference for equal dual-
earning and against specialization in East Germany means that her education, the presence 
of children and his labor market insecurity should be less relevant in predicting her 
contribution compared to West Germany. Better childcare coverage in East Germany should 
further decrease the effect of children as a predictor in East Germany compared to West 
Germany. We furthermore predict the relevance of these micro-level determinants to vary 
substantially across the male partner’s position on the earnings’ distribution (Hypothesis 5): 
we anticipate children to be less predictive of her contributions when partnered with a low 
earner (Hypothesis 5.1) as economic necessity makes it harder to specialize; we predict her 
education to be more central when he is a low-earner (Hypothesis 5.2) as opportunity costs 
are not counterbalanced by constraints and the disincentive effects of a high earning partner; 
and finally we predict insecurities in his employment to be less relevant for her contributions 
when he is high earning (Hypothesis 5.3) as the risk of unemployment and, more importantly, 
unemployment entrapment, is lower among high earning (and highly educated) men.   
 
4 Data and Analytical Strategy  
We use the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), a representative longitudinal household 
panel study that has been running since 1984 (Goebel et al. 2018). East Germany was included 
in the SOEP, as early as 1990, the year of German re-unification. Apart from this extension to 
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cover all German federal states in one study, the SOEP is not constrained to the original 
sample, but includes also households and individuals that enter the survey in later years. New 
entries happen through 1.) households splitting and individuals forming new households; 2.) 
individuals entering existing SOEP households (by moving in, birth etc.); and finally 3.) through 
regular refreshment samples (1998, 2000, 2006, 2011, 2012) (Kroh et al. 2018). Information 
is collected via different modes with face-to-face interviews being the default. Considerable 
effort and research are devoted to maximise cooperation and response rates (see Goebel et 
al. 2018; Schröder et al. 2013). The aforementioned regular refreshment samples ensure 
representativeness for all German federal states and sensible sample size despite attrition 
(for detailed information on fieldwork, survey modes and data quality management please 
see Goebel et al. 2018; for information on initial response rates and attrition please see Kroh 
et al.2018 ).    
For our study we use data from 1992-2016. Given our research questions, we select 
dual-earning cohabiting heterosexual couples and those of “prime working age”, excluding 
those below 25 and above 54 years. Before the age of 25 many individuals are still on their 
pathway into (stable) employment, while after the age of 54 some have begun to exit 
employment for retirement or begun their pathway to retirement (e.g. reduce their working 
time as part of a phased or partial retirement strategy)(e.g. Eurostat 2014; OECD 2019; 
Wanger 2010). This age selection also corresponds to the period when individuals are more 
likely to be in stable unions with shared earning and working strategies. Aside from these 
selections, we exclude all cases with missing information on key covariatesiv resulting in a 
sample size of 11,554 for East Germany and 31,629 for West Germany. For our regression 
analyses the sample is further constrained to those with valid information for contract type, 
employee status and sector (please refer to Table A1 in the appendix for key sample 
statistics): resulting in a sample size of 9,280 for East Germany and 26, 234 for West Germany. 
Our dependent variable, the partner pay gap, is defined as her gross monthly labor income 
over the combined gross monthly labor income of the dual-earning couple. Our dependent 
variable reflects her relative contributions to total earned household income.  
Our descriptive analyses aim to investigate how the partner pay gap varies across the 
two cultural and economic contexts under study, how it has evolved over time and how it 
varies by socio-economic position. All descriptive estimations are cross-sectionally weighted 
to ensure representativeness to the national population. The aim of our regression analysis is 
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to examine the individual-level and household-level determinants of the partner pay gap and 
whether these vary in East- and West-Germany as well as by socio-economic position. We 
examine variance in the partner pay gap by tertiles of the male partner’s position in the 
annual earned income distribution. For this purpose we  calculated tertile position separately 
for each survey year.  
Our regression estimations treat the 25 years of panel data as repeat cross-sections. 
We fit Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression models with robust standard errors that control 
for clustering within person years. Our models are corrected for selectivity into employment 
(Heckman 1979). Our Heckman selection models include age, nationality, education, the 
presence of a newborn in the preceding time period, children dummies, 24 year dummies and 
a constant: 
 
Di =  γ'zi + ui 
 
with D a dichotomous variable identifying whether the woman is employed or not and z our 
vector of covariates. Year dummies are included to control for the increasing labor market 
participation and therefore lower selectivity of women across our time window, spanning 
more than two decades.  
Our regressions examine the impact of individual-level and household-level variables 
on partnered women’s relative contribution to household earnings. We include theoretically 
relevant individual-level variables: We differentiate between the presence of small children 
(4 years and younger), pre-school and young school children (between 5 and 11 years) and 
older children (aged 12 and older). We measure differences in educational level using two 
dichotomous variables distinguishing those in receipt of vocational qualifications as well as 
those in receipt of a tertiary degree. Variables pertinent to the respondents’ work situation 
and to that of their male partner include: her and his working-time status (with part-time 
defined as working 30 hours or less in the main job), her and his fixed-term and temporary 
employment, her and his self-employment as well as her and his public sector employment. 
To examine how the level of women’s contribution to household income has changed over 
time, we introduce a series of grouped time dummies into our model, providing a more 
detailed measurement of possible fluctuations over time than a continuous measure would.v  
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Finally, our models also include the following controls: age as a categorical variable, 
an indicator of whether she has a higher level of education than him or not, an indicator of 
whether a woman is substantially younger than her partner (age gap >3 years), and marital 
status.  
 
5 Results 
5.1 Time trends in the partner pay   
We precede our analysis on the partner pay gap among dual-earner cohabiting couples with 
a brief exploration of time trends in dual-earning in West and East Germany. Figure 1 shows 
that over the observation period, West Germany exhibits an increase in dual-earning from 51 
percent in 1992 to around 79 percent in 2016, which is a more substantial change than the 
one we observe for East Germany where the increase was from 63 to over 78 percent. While 
at the outset of our observation period, the share of dual-earner couples was 12 percentage 
points higher in East Germany, by the end of it East and West German rates have converged. 
Importantly, the graph also shows a strong upsurge in dual-earning from 2005 onwards, in 
both East and West Germany. This coincides with the introduction of the Hartz reforms, which 
entailed substantial labor market deregulation, as well as parental leave reforms, and the 
growth in childcare provision for small children.  
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FIGURE 1: Trends in the Share of Dual Earning Households in % 
Notes: Own calculations using SOEP 1992-2016. Only women aged 25-54years with working partners. 
 
 
 
FIGURE 2 – Female Contribution to Household Labor Income in % 
Notes: Own calculations using SOEP 1992-2016. Only dual earners, women aged 25-54years with working partners. 
 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
East Germany West Germany
0.00
5.00
10.00
15.00
20.00
25.00
30.00
35.00
40.00
45.00
50.00
EAST GERMANY Mean EAST GERMANY CI EAST GERMANY CI
WEST Germany Mean WEST Germany CI WEST Germany CI
16 
 
Figure 2 reveals the partner pay gap in dual-earner couples during our observation period. 
The partner pay gap measures her proportional contribution to household income. We 
observe very clear evidence of a partner pay gap, with women contributing substantially less 
than men. This graph demonstrates that the rise in dual-earning during our observation 
period, as shown in Figure 1, is not accompanied by a clear rise in equal-earning. The earnings 
gap within couples appears to be fairly resistant to the macro-level changes we had 
anticipated to trigger a decline in the partner pay gap. However, West German women show 
a small increase in their proportional contributions: these have increased by three percentage 
points over the whole observation period. Notably there was a growth of 5 percentage points 
between the mid 2000s and the end of our observation window, which can – in the same way 
as the growth in dual-earning – arguably be attributed to the aforementioned reforms and 
developments in Germany. Notably, however, East German women actually exhibit a decline 
over the observation period (by 2 percentage points).   Overall, then, our descriptive evidence 
provides some but not very strong support for hypothesis 1. 
There are interesting differences in her relative contributions by context as was predicted by 
hypothesis 2: East German women contribute higher proportions, between 40 and 45 
percent, in West Germany her economic contribution is much lower, ranging from 30 to 34 
percent. As outlined earlier, these East-West differences in the partner-pay gap may on the 
one hand be attributable to cultural differences and on the other due to economic 
differences, such as the lower level of overall income inequality in the East as well as the low 
earnings of East German men. Figures A1.1. and A1.2 (based on working individuals aged 25-
54, but without selection on partnered individuals) in the annex demonstrate that the low 
absolute earnings of East German men are indeed also very central drivers of the East-West 
differences in the partner pay gap: East German men earn substantially less than their West 
German counterparts – both monthly and hourly – while East-West differences in women’s 
earnings are much less pronounced. Notably, though, West German women’s hourly earnings 
are higher, while East German women have slightly higher monthly earnings (their higher 
hourly labor market participation thus more than compensates the lower remuneration).   
Figure 3 identifies variation in the partner pay gap by socio-economic position. We 
observe that the partner pay gap is least pronounced in partnerships where his earnings fall 
into the lowest tertile and most pronounced in partnerships where his earnings fall into the 
highest tertile confirming hypothesis 3. Given that partnerships tend to be homogenous in 
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terms of education (and hence earnings potential), our evidence does suggest partner’s 
income, as well as the associated constraints of his high income position, trump the effect of  
opportunity costs for women in the highest tertile. We also find that economic necessity 
appears to encourage higher contributions of women, despite their lower opportunity costs, 
in the lowest income tertile. Additional analyses restricted to educationally homogamous 
couples confirm this pattern further supporting this interpretation (see annex Figure A2). But, 
as noted previously, aside from these explanations, differences between male and female 
wage structures at the top of the earnings distribution may also be a likely explanatory factor. 
There are some interesting differences across the analytic cases: first, East German women 
partnered with low earners reach earning parity, while in West Germany this group only 
contributes 40 percent of household labor income. East German women married to high 
earners contribute between 30-40 percent of total household labor income, while their 
contribution is again substantially lower in West Germany (between 22-28 percent in West 
Germany). Can we observe any tertile-specific trends in the data? We find some evidence that 
the small increase in her contributions over time which we saw in the pooled data for West 
Germany (especially from the mid 2000s onwards), is mainly driven by couples in the top und 
middle tertile. In East Germany the pooled analysis hid interesting differences by tertile: while 
women married to men at the top tertile of earnings experienced a decline in contributions 
of 8 percentage points over the observation period, women partnered with men in the middle 
or bottom of the distribution experience small increases in their contributions over the 
observation period (between 2-3 percentage points).  
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FIGURE 3 –Female Contribution to Household Labor Income in %, by Tertile  
Notes: Own calculations using SOEP 1992-2016. Only dual earners, women aged 25-54years with working partners. 
 
5.2 Determinants of the Partner Pay Gap  
In Table 1 we try to uncover the variables which affect her relative economic contributions to 
household labor income in more detail controlling for labor market participation using a 
Heckman correction. We control for individual-level demographic variables that relate to her 
individual earning capacity, as well as variables pertaining to her working status and that of 
0.00
10.00
20.00
30.00
40.00
50.00
60.00
East Germany
Tercile 1 Mean Tercile 1 CI Tercile 1 CI
Tercile 2 Mean Tercile 2 CI Tercile 2 CI
Tercile 3 Mean Tercile 3 CI Tercile 3 CI
0.00
5.00
10.00
15.00
20.00
25.00
30.00
35.00
40.00
45.00
50.00
West Germany
Tercile 1 Mean Tercile 1 CI Tercile 1 CI
Tercile 2 Mean Tercile 2 CI Tercile 2 CI
Tercile 3 Mean Tercile 3 CI Tercile 3 CI
19 
 
her partner. Crucial to our analysis, we also measure trends and variation in her labor income 
share over time. We begin with a series of nested models that investigate her mean 
contribution without differentiating by socio-economic position. Model 1 controls for time 
period, standard socio-demographic variables as well as within couple differences therein, 
while Model 2 additionally includes variables that capture variance in both partners’ labor 
market position.  We show our regression analyses separately for East and West Germany. 
Note, though, that statements about significant differences between coefficients for East and 
West Germany are based on significance tests explicitly focusing on differences between the 
two samples. vi  
Model 1 suggests that children in the home significantly decrease her economic 
contributions (by between 1.7 and 5.6 percentage points depending on the age of the child). 
Children are significantly less predictive of her earnings contributions in East Germany than 
in West Germany. This was hypothesized (hypothesis 4.1) given the greater gender 
egalitarianism in East Germany and its better childcare coverage. As one would expect, we 
find the size of the penalty for mothers declines substantially in Model 2 which controls for 
labor market characteristics, underscoring the central role of labor market choices and 
constraints. Notably, once we control for labor market characteristics, the differential effect 
of children in East and West Germany is no longer statistically significant. Contrary to 
Beckerian, as well as game-theoretic predictions, we find that women with vocational 
education contribute less household labor income than unskilled women in West Germany, 
while there is no significant difference between unskilled and skilled women in East Germany 
in Model 1. We do find, however, that women with university education contribute 
substantially and significantly more than unskilled women in West Germany, in East Germany 
the effect of a university degree is not significant.  
 
TABLE 1 – Her relative contribution in % of household labor income as a function of socio-
demographic, job characteristics, and time trends (Heckman corrected model)   
  West Germany East Germany 
  Model 1   Model 2   Model 1   Model 2   
Age 35-44yrs -0.796 * 0.603 * 0.350   0.238   
Age 45-54yrs -2.903 *** 0.010   -0.105   -0.203   
Vocational training -2.049 ** -0.827   0.241   0.711   
Tertiary education 1.925 * 0.213   2.534   0.214   
Children 0 to 4 -3.360 *** 1.201 * -2.071 * -0.880   
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Children 5 to 10 -5.795 *** -0.913 ** -2.404 *** -0.953 ** 
Children 11+ -5.733 *** -1.729 *** -1.799 ** -1.089 ** 
Married -6.211 *** -2.742 *** -0.304   0.410   
Woman younger -0.609   -0.736 * 0.138   -0.135   
Woman higher education  3.009 *** 2.980 *** 6.285 *** 5.750 *** 
Woman PT (<=30 hours)   -17.878 ***     -12.303 *** 
Man PT (<=30 hours)   12.346 ***     12.893 *** 
Woman fixed   -2.717 ***     -4.087 *** 
Man fixed   4.097 ***     3.909 *** 
Woman self empl.   -2.489 ***     -2.726 ** 
Man self empl.   -1.283 *     0.331   
Woman public sector   4.260 ***     6.762 *** 
Man public sector   0.099       2.918 *** 
Period 1997-2001 -2.189 *** -0.869 ** -0.088   0.414   
Period 2002-2006 -3.593 *** -1.160 ** -1.013  0.238   
Period 2007-2011 -4.084 *** -1.580 *** -3.117 *** -0.489   
Period 2012-2016 -3.518 *** -1.537 *** -2.200 ** 0.165   
Inverse Mills Ratio -6.072 *** -3.713 *** -3.801   -0.542   
Intercept 49.540 *** 46.802 *** 46.158 *** 36.964 *** 
 N of obs (R2) 26,234 (R2=0.18) 26,234 (R2=0.49) 9,280 (R2=0.08) 9,280(R2=0.33) 
Notes: Own calculations using SOEP 1992-2016. Only dual earners, women aged 25-54years with working partners. 
*p<.05 **p<.01, ***p<.001 (two-sided tests). Robust standard errors accounting for clustering within person years.  
The differential impact of her tertiary education in East and West Germany is not 
statistically significant, however, and hypothesis 4.2 can therefore not be confirmed. Once 
the effect of (his and her) labor market participation and allocation is accounted for in Model 
2, tertiary education is no longer a relevant predictor in West Germany. Interestingly, we find 
a sizable marital penalty in West Germany but not East Germany.   
 
Our results confirm the negative impact that part-time employment has on women’s 
economic status within households. We find that women contribute between 12-18 
percentage points less to household income if they work part-time, and similarly, that 
women’s contributions are much greater, 13 percentage points higher if their partner works 
part-time. Likewise, also her fixed-term employment is found to reduce her contributions (by 
3 to 4 percentage points), while the opposite is the case for her partner’s fixed-term 
employment – this increases her contributions by 4 percentage points. We find negative 
effects of her self-employment in both East and West Germany. His self-employment 
decreases her contributions significantly in West-Germany, but not in East Germany (and this 
difference between East and West is statistically significant). The variation between his self-
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employment in East and West is not statistically significant, however. Finally, our results show 
that women’s contributions are higher if based in the public sector in both East and West 
Germany. His public sector employment significantly increases her contribution in East 
Germany, but not in West Germany. Aside from his public sector employment, we find no 
evidence that his labor market characteristics are more important predictors of her relative 
contributions in West Germany compared to East Germany. Specifically, we had predicted 
that his labor market insecurity – measured by fixed-term employment – would be a stronger 
predictor of her contributions in West Germany compared to East (hypothesis 4.3). The 
rationale was that her supply and contributions would be more responsive to economic 
insecurity in a setting with a more traditional gender regime than in a more egalitarian setting 
with a stronger preference for equal dual-earning irrespective of economic considerations. 
Fixed-term employment is, however, not only associated with labor market insecurity but also 
with lower earnings. Therefore, his employment on a fixed-term contract is likely to increase 
women’s contribution to household income by lowering his income – even if her labor market 
behavior was completely unresponsive to his labor market insecurity. To test the impact of 
his employment insecurity net of the lower income associated with fixed-term employment, 
in additional tests we also included his earnings. The results (available upon request) show 
that his fixed-term employment is no longer a significant predictor in East Germany, while in 
West Germany the coefficient is reduced, but his fixed-term employment continues to have 
a shaping effect on her earnings. The difference between East and West is not statistically 
significant, however.  
A central aim of our analyses was to examine time trends in her economic 
contributions to household labor income over time. In these regressions we can examine 
change over time controlling for compositional change in terms of demographic as well as 
labor market variables. We measure trends in her economic contributions over time and 
provide tests of fluctuations across time periods through the inclusion of a series of dummy 
variables broken down into 5-year time periods. In Model 1 we establish a statistically 
significant decline in her financial contributions over time in East and West Germany. Model 
1 suggests her contributions dropped by 3.5 percentage points between the early 1990s (our 
reference time period) and the period 2012-16 in West Germany, and by 2 percentage points 
in East Germany. Notably, much of the change in both East and West Germany happened 
until 2011: this is striking as policy developments during these years led us to believe that her 
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contributions would grow. The tendencies are found in our Model 1 which controls for socio-
demographic characteristics and within couple inequalities and which also controls for 
selection into paid employment. We thus have evidence of increasing inequalities among 
dual-earning couples in Germany over time. The trend of a small increase in her relative 
contributions in West Germany which our descriptive analysis suggested (see Figure 2) is 
hence reversed once compositional change over time pertaining to demographic 
characteristics are accounted for, the finding of a small decline in her contributions in East 
Germany confirmed. However, in Model 2, which controls for the forms and conditions of 
employment for dual-earning couples, the time trend changes in important ways. First, the 
negative time trend in West Germany is reduced. This suggests that the tendency for 
increased inequality found in Model 1 is in part due to the changing working-conditions of 
dual-earning couples, which have affected her earnings more negatively than his over time. 
Second, in East Germany the time trend loses all significance in Model 2, again underscoring 
the negative impact that changes in working-conditions have had on households’ capacity for 
equal dual earning. So while the descriptive analysis gave some weak support for our 
hypothesis of decreasing inequality over time, the evidence of our regression analyses clearly 
rejects it (i.e. hypothesis 1). 
Our next series of analyses (Table 2A for East Germany; 2B for West Germany) 
examine variation in the effects of these predictors by socio-economic group (defined by the 
male partner’s position in the earnings distribution). We formulated the general expectation 
that the relevance of micro-level determinants would vary by socio-economic group 
(hypothesis 5). The analyses are presented separately by tertile. In the following, whenever 
we make statements about significant differences between tertiles, this is based on formal 
tests of statistical difference.vii 
TABLE 2A – Her relative contribution in % of household labor income by tertiles: East 
Germany (Heckman corrected model) 
  Tertile 1  (Low earning partner) Tertile 2  
Tertile 3  
(High earning partner) 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 1  Model 2  Model 1 
 Model 
2 
 
Age 35-44 0.871   0.789   0.765   0.669   0.631   0.186   
Age 45-54 0.579   0.608   1.610   1.206   0.802   0.115   
Vocational training 2.234   2.110   2.912   2.981   -6.133 ** -2.065   
Tertiary education 11.492 *** 7.390 ** 8.020 ** 6.860 ** -0.366   2.101   
Children 0 to 4 -1.500   -0.981   -1.114   0.549   -2.734 * -1.895  
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Children 5 to 10 -2.462 ** -1.318 * -0.549   0.429   -2.160 ** -1.025   
Children 11+ -2.027 * -0.674   -1.153   -0.467   -1.177   -1.328 * 
Married 0.418   0.662   -0.103   0.437   -2.418 ** -1.310   
Woman younger -0.705   -0.695   -0.906   -0.595   0.348   -0.081   
Woman higher 
educ. -1.494   -0.938   1.092   1.001   -0.019   0.364   
Woman PT (<=30 hours)   -10.988 ***     -11.703 ***     -10.524 
**
* 
Man PT (<=30 hours)   12.668 ***     0.952       3.593 ** 
Woman fixed   -4.266 ***     -5.461 ***     -4.062 
**
* 
Man fixed     1.787       0.548       0.056   
Woman self empl.   -3.822 *     -2.449       -1.670   
Man self empl.     3.279 *     -0.729       -0.954   
Woman public sector   7.662 **     6.804 ***     5.927 
**
* 
Man public sector     1.260 ***     0.170       -1.165   
Period 1997-2001 0.597   0.919  0.364   0.635   -0.870   -0.413   
Period 2002-2006 1.213   1.973 ** -1.052   0.733   -2.579 ** -1.751 ** 
Period 2007-2011 1.234   2.875 ** -3.640 *** -0.759   -5.869 
**
* -3.315 
**
* 
Period 2012-2016 1.483   3.208 ** -3.273 ** -1.148   -4.829 *** -2.461 ** 
Inverse Mills Ratio -1.762   0.416   -5.481  -3.001   -3.247   0.636   
Intercept 47.308 *** 0.000 *** 42.476 *** 39.530 *** 45.629 *** 41.638 
**
* 
 N of obs (R2) 3,131 (R2=0.12) 
3,131 
(R2=0.38) 
3,071 
(R2=0.14) 
3,071 
(R2=0.42) 
3,009 
(R2=0.15) 
3,009 
(R2=0.40) 
Notes: Own calculations using  SOEP 1992-2016. Only dual earners, women aged 25-54 years with working partners. 
*p<.05 **p<.01, ***p<.001 (two-sided tests). Robust standard errors accounting for clustering within person years. 
 
We show in Model 1 (Table 2A & 2B) that children decrease women’s contribution 
irrespective of her partners’ position in the earnings distribution, although this effect varies 
somewhat across tertiles with insignificant effects of children in the middle income group in 
East Germany. The size of the effect of children on her contributions is notably reduced in 
Model 2 once the extent and type of her and his labor market participation is controlled for. 
The similarity of the impact of children across groups is striking and against our expectation 
of group-specific differences (Hypothesis 5.1). It is also worth noting that, after controlling for 
her labor market participation, we find that women with very young children in tertiles one 
and three in West Germany have higher contributions than their counterparts without 
children in the household.  
TABLE 2B – Her relative contribution in % of household labor income by tertiles: West 
Germany (Heckman corrected model) 
 Tertile 1  
(Low earning partner) Tertile 2 
Tertile 3  
(High earning partner) 
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 Model 1  Model 2  Model 1  Model 2  Model 1  Model 2  
Age 35-44 0.929  1.793 *** 0.828  1.358 *** 0.093  1.342 ** 
Age 45-54 -0.505  1.726 ** -0.216  1.372 ** -1.013  1.163 * 
Vocational training 1.643  1.186  0.169  1.505 ** -2.122 * -0.408 
 
Tertiary Education 10.500 *** 5.969 *** 8.795 *** 6.435 *** 3.839 *** 3.036 *** 
Children 0 to 4 -2.783 * 1.843 * -4.134 *** -0.154  -1.421  2.226 ** 
Children 5 to 10 -5.014 *** -0.259  -6.483 *** -1.645 *** -4.365 *** -0.718  
Children 11+ -4.799 *** -1.132 * -6.039 *** -2.151 *** -5.281 *** -1.964 *** 
Married -5.753 *** -2.949 *** -5.769 *** -2.122 *** -5.388 *** -2.626 *** 
Woman younger 0.240  -0.060 
 -0.536  -0.625 
 -0.683  -1.098 ** 
Woman higher education -1.339  -0.622  -0.069  0.261  -0.147  0.711  
Woman PT (<=30 hours)  -18.743 *** 
 
 -17.041 *** 
  -14.797 *** 
Man PT (<=30 hours)  10.296 *** 
 
 5.450 *** 
  3.264 ** 
Woman fixed  -1.936 *** 
 
 -3.662 *** 
  -3.669 *** 
Man fixed   2.656 *** 
 
 -0.479 
   0.288  
Woman self empl.  -3.786 ** 
 
 -1.333 
   -1.538  
Man self empl.   5.580 *** 
 
 -1.890 * 
  -3.034 *** 
Woman public sector  5.174 *** 
 
 4.501 *** 
  3.520 *** 
Man public sector   0.905 
  
 -0.323 
   -1.558 ** 
Period 1997-2001 -2.951 *** -1.199 * -2.167 *** -0.819 * -2.589 *** -1.852 *** 
Period 2002-2006 -4.022 *** -1.089  -4.620 *** -1.853 *** -4.346 *** -2.919 *** 
Period 2007-2011 -4.175 *** -1.274 * -5.894 *** -2.558 *** -5.272 *** -3.815 *** 
Period 2012-2016 -4.143 *** -1.429 * -5.744 *** -2.751 *** -4.915 *** -3.937 *** 
Inverse Mills Ratio -5.737 ** -4.380 *** -5.180 *** -1.830  -8.393 *** -5.571 *** 
Intercept 50.866 *** 48.025 *** 46.035 *** 43.559 *** 42.470 *** 44.174 *** 
N of obs (R2) 8,813 (R2=0.16) 8,813 (R2=0.52) 8,661 (R2=0.26) 8,661 (R2=0.56) 8,432 (R2=0.24) 
8,432 
(R2=0.51) 
Notes: Own calculations using  SOEP 1992-2014. Only dual earners, women aged 25-54 years with working partners. *p<.05 
**p<.01, ***p<.001 (two-sided tests). Robust standard errors accounting for clustering within person years. 
 
We find variation in the association between women’s level of education and their 
contribution to household labor income by socio-economic group consistent with our 
hypothesis 5.2. Model 1 confirms that her relative contribution to household labor income is 
higher if she has been educated to tertiary level, and also that the effect is substantially and 
significantly more pronounced within the first compared to the third tertile (in fact in Eastern 
Germany tertiary level education is not even associated with her contributions in the third 
tertile). The differentials by socio-economic group could be an indication that opportunity 
costs may interact with economic effects: women with higher levels of education contribute 
significantly more to household income in lower socio-economic groups. In the context of the 
theories outlined earlier, the weaker education effects for women partnered with high 
earners could indicate that for this group “constraints” and possibly also “income” effects 
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trump opportunity cost considerations. In line with this, we observe that controlling for work 
and employment characteristics (Model 2), substantially reduces the amount of variation 
between the first and the third tertile. Nevertheless, the variation in the importance of 
tertiary level education for her contribution to household labor income remains significant. It 
has to be noted, however, that with our analytical strategy we cannot separate the effect of 
her behavior and her adjustments from the direct effect of his earnings:  even if all partnered 
women with tertiary level education behaved identically, those married with low earners 
would contribute more to household labor income. We tried to address this by controlling for 
educational homogamy, but this is will not fully solve the issue. We believe that the 
differential effect of her tertiary education by tertile is probably driven by both dynamics.  
Turning to the role of employment characteristics, we find that working part-time or being in 
fixed-term employment reduce her contributions for all tertiles. While in East Germany there 
is no indication of differences in the size of the penalty between tertiles, in West Germany 
the extent of the penalty varies significantly.  However, the effect of his type of employment 
on the partner pay gap varies much more notably across tertiles. Here we find male part-time 
work to be a much stronger determinant of her economic contributions to household labor 
income for women partnered with low earners than for women partnered with higher 
earners: a low-earning male part-timer increases his female partner’s contributions by 
between 10 to 13 percentage points, while a high-earning male part-timer only increases it 
by 3-4 percentage points. We also note a similar dynamic for other forms of non-standard 
contract employment: men in fixed-term contracts tend to reduce the partner pay gap 
amongst the lowest socio-economic groups only (group-specific variation is statistically 
significant only in West Germany however). We also find substantial and significant variation 
for partner’s self-employment: his self-employment reduces the partner pay gap in the lowest 
tertile (in both East and West Germany), while they have no effect for the middle and upper 
tertile in East Germany and even increase the partner-pay gap for middle and upper tertile 
couples in West Germany. 
Our statistical models also allow us to examine whether the trends in the partner-pay 
gap by income group (as evinced in our descriptive analyses cf. Figure 3) remain once 
compositional changes within these groups are controlled for. In West Germany we find her 
economic contributions to have declined over time in each group (in both Model 1 and 2). In 
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East Germany the evidence is more mixed. Here Model 1 suggests no time trend for the 
bottom tertile while there is evidence of a decline in her contributions among high and middle 
income households. However, once we also control for form and type of employment (Model 
2), East German women are found to have increasing contributions over time if partnered to 
low earners, no clear trend for those partnered with medium earners and a negative trend 
amongst the richer households.   
 
6 Summary and conclusions 
Women are not equal contributors to household labor income. In dual-earner couples their 
current contribution to household income lies between 35 and 45 percent. We find 
substantial differences by cultural and economic context: the partner pay gap is more 
pronounced in West Germany than in the East German context. We established statistically 
significant declines in her financial contributions over time among dual-earning couples in 
East and West Germany. Importantly, however, we found the tendency for increased within 
couple inequality to vanish in East Germany, and to weaken in West Germany, once 
employment characteristics are taken into account. Increases in the partner pay gap in 
Germany are thus driven by the changing employment conditions of dual-earning households, 
which appear to have affected her earnings more negatively than his over time. In our 
analyses which split the sample into tertiles we found that her relative contributions are 
substantially higher amongst women partnered with low earners than amongst those who 
have high earning partners even though the majority of couples in our sample are 
educationally homogamous. We found a trend of increasing inequality across all tertiles in 
West Germany, but revealed strong differences in this trend by income group in East 
Germany. In East Germany increases in within-couple inequality were specific to the highest 
earning tertile. For the lowest tertile we saw a tendency of reduced inequality over time, an 
effect which was stronger once employment characteristics were controlled for.  
Our analyses investigating the micro-level determinants of the partner pay gap 
showed that children decrease women’s financial contributions to household labor income 
and that higher levels of education raise her contributions. Again, we found context mattered, 
with children having substantially smaller effects in East Germany (which is culturally and 
institutionally more supportive of working motherhood and equal dual-earning). We further 
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showed that his atypical employment increases her contributions, though this was not the 
case for self-employment. Our results exposed important differences by partner’s earnings 
position: tertiary level education is a much stronger predictor of her relative contributions for 
women coupled with low earners than for women coupled with high earners – even when 
controlling for educational homogamy in partnerships. The impact of children, by contrast, 
was strikingly similar across the different tertiles. His fixed-term or self-employment 
employment only increases her contributions (or reduces the partner pay gap) in the low 
tertiles.  
Overall, our analyses suggest strong and persistent earnings inequalities amongst dual-
earner couples, which appear strikingly robust to institutional change. Policies and 
institutional change may have been successful in increasing dual earning, but we have found 
little impact on the economic inequality, which exists within dual-earner couples. Our 
contribution identifies the role of socio-economic context to household specialization and 
within couple earnings inequalities. Our interpretation of the results is that the partner pay  
is driven – to a substantial extent – by ‘income effects’ with his high income suppressing 
female earnings in combination with the constraints that high earning men’s jobs impose on 
their female partners’ pursuit of a career (e.g. Stone 2007). The evidence of a tendency for 
the large and increasing partner pay gap amongst the higher earning tertiles is not solely 
driven by couples’ normative preferences and specialization decisions but will also be 
influenced by structural constraints in the pursuit of dual-earning, including occupational 
segregation and discrimination. A more general complication of our analysis is that a study on 
within couple earnings inequalities, using a dependent variable measuring the share of her 
contributions to household income, has to deal with the challenge that the inequalities we 
are observing and their determinants are a function of both, her and his labor market 
decisions, behavior and outcomes. In some instances we were unable to disentangle 
theoretical mechanisms. This is necessarily the case when using a dependent variable which 
is a ratio of two people’s earnings: her contributions can rise from both her economic 
achievements as well as his economic losses. In many ways then our study is purely 
descriptive and explorative. Nevertheless, we believe that our findings support our 
interpretation that the constraints, needs and opportunities inherent in the couple context 
and the resulting joint decisions and labor market behaviour are central drivers of the partner 
pay gaps observed. The persisting and marked economic inequalities within dual earner 
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couples are important findings in and of themselves, but are especially relevant given that we 
know that these inequalities increase women’s likelihood to (further) reduce their working 
hours and/or to exit the labor market altogether. 
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ANNEX  
 
 
 FIGURE A1.1 – Trends in Monthly Earnings at the Mean (in Euros) 
Notes: Own calculations using SOEP 1992-2016. Only dual earners, women aged 25-54years with working partners. 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE A1.2 – Trends in Hourly Earnings at the Mean – Dual Earners 
Notes: Own calculations using SOEP 1992-2016. Only dual earners, women aged 25-54years with working partners. 
 
 
 
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
3500
4000
1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016
East Germany WOMEN
East Germany PARTNER
West Germany WOMEN
0
5
10
15
20
25
East Germany WOMEN East Germany PARTNER
West Germany WOMEN West Germany PARTNER
36 
 
 
FIGURE A2 – Female Contribution to Household Labor Income in % 
for Couples with Same Level of Education 
Notes: Own calculations using SOEP 1992-2016. Only dual earners, women aged 25-54years with working partners. 
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Table A1 Key Sample Statistics (at the mean and by income tertiles) 
 East Germany West Germany 
 Mean Tercile 1 Tercile 2 Tercile 3 Mean Tercile 1 Tercile 2 Tercile 3 
         
Children         
0-4yrs 9.2 9.1 9.0 9.0 11.2 11.4 10.7 11.0 
5-10yrs 23.4 22.2 23.1 24.6 27.2 26.6 26.9 28.0 
11+yrs 40.5 39.6 40.7 41.7 38.8 36.0 38.6 42.2 
Education         
Woman tertiary ed. 36.3 29.4 31.4 49.3 16.9 10.8 12.3 25.9 
Partner educationally homogenous 66.5 65.8 65.6 67.5 66.3 66.6 68.6 62.9 
Job characteristics         
Woman working part-time 23.1 18.8 22.4 27.8 57.1 50.6 58.0 63.1 
Male partner working part-time. 2.2 3.7 1.1 1.5 2.2 3.9 1.2 1.1 
Woman public sector 37.8 35.2 36.7 42.8 30.2 26.5 30.9 33.0 
Man public sector 19.3 8.8 19.8 29.3 21.4 17.3 26.1 20.4 
Notes: Own calculations using SOEP 1992-2016. Only dual earners, women aged 25-54years with working partners. 
 
Endnotes 
i The paper limits its analytic focus to heterosexual couples. Whenever we refer to couples hereafter we mean 
heterosexual couples.    
ii This operationalization allows us to examine how her labor market participation and her relative economic 
contributions to households’ labor income vary with her partner’s position in the income hierarchy, while it 
also enables us to circumvent the endogeneity problems inherent when using the combined measure of his 
and her household labor income.   
iii Maternity leaves normally refer to the short-term leave around childbirth exclusively available to women and 
often compulsory; parental leave refers to employment-protected leave of absence for parents (see OECD 
2017 for definitions). Given that – in practice – most parental leave is taken up by women, most studies focus 
on the combined length of maternity and parental leave to examine the impact of leave length on female 
employment outcomes.  
iv We exclude those with missing information on; age, labor market status, educational attainment, presence of 
children in the household, hours worked and labor income share. 
v Tests with continuous measures of time produced similar results (available upon request). 
vi These tests are available from the authors upon request 
vii These tests are available from the authors upon request. 
                                                          
